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In the orthodox version of externally-narrated fiction, the questions, 
“who speaks,” “who writes,” and “who sees,” when directed toward 
the narrator or narrating agency, are non-productive ones from the 
perspective of the world that is narrated. To ask these questions would 
require moving from the world of the story and into the world of the 
author; or, at the very least, one would be required to make use of 
a critical construct such as that of the “implied author,” in order to 
transgress—albeit in fiction—the fictional frame.1 The purely external 
narrator speaks or writes from a perspective that is disengaged from 
any responsibility as an actor in the world, in order to become pure 
observer. The inability to assign a perspective to such a narrator while 
remaining solely within the frame of the work proper has long served 
as an index of the fictional.
In the case of internally-narrated fiction, and particularly when the 
narrator is also the hero of the narrative (Gérard Genette’s “autodi-
egetic” narrative),2 the issue becomes more complicated, because here 
MLN 129 (2014): 855–880 © 2015 by Johns Hopkins University Press
1See Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 71ff. Part of the function of the implied author, is, 
as Booth argues, to reveal the ideology of the author through an often ironic contrast 
with that of the narrative voice. Others, such as Bal, use this as evidence against the 
possibility of such a notion (Bal, “The Laughing Mice”).
2The term “homodiegetic” seems to have more currency than the species of homodie-
getic narrator that Genette terms the “autodiegetic”: “Il faudra . . . distinguer à l’intérieur 
du type homodiégétique, deux variétés: l’une où le narrateur est le héros de son récit 
. . . et l’autre où il ne joue qu’un rôle secondaire, qui se trouve être, pour ainsi dire 
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the narrator’s allegiances are split between that of actor and observer. 
But because of the incompatibility of these two roles (and in particular 
because the act of writing can never coincide with the content of what 
is written), the narrator qua narrator cannot simply inhabit the role 
of actor while engaging, at the same time, in the act of narrating.3 
This becomes a problematic for modernity in its concern with, as 
Jonathan Crary describes it, “remaking the individual as observer into 
something calculable and regularizable and . . . human vision into 
something measurable and thus exchangeable” (17). We see in the 
modern novel the tendency, in narration, to emphasize the experi-
ence of the narrator—and to account for his or her presence. This 
is very different from, for example, the “chatty” external narrators of 
the English novels of the eighteenth century, whose authorial intru-
sions generally serve the function of asserting the narrator’s presence, 
but who do so without attempting to establish a narrative plane that 
houses both authors and character, or in the epistolary novels of the 
same period, where the lack of space between narrator and character 
conceal the contours of the issue.
That the problematic relation between the observing self who nar-
rates and the experiencing self who is narrated is an issue for Proust 
from very early on can be seen in an excerpt from a letter that he 
writes at age sixteen to his philosophy teacher Alphonse Darlu at the 
Lycée Condorcet:
Quand je lis par exemple un poème de Leconte de Lisle, tandis que j’y 
goûte les voluptés infinies d’autrefois, l’autre moi me considère, s’amuse à 
considérer les causes de mon plaisir, les voit dans un certain rapport entre 
moi et l’œuvre, par là détruit la certitude de la beauté propre de l’œuvre, 
toujours, un rôle d’observateur et de témoin. . . . Nous réserverons pour la première 
variété (qui représente en quelque sorte le degré fort de l’homodiégétique) le terme, 
qui s’impose, d’autodiégétique” ‘[We] will have to differentiate within the homodietic 
type at least two varieties: one where the narrator is the hero of his narrative . . . and 
one where he plays only a secondary role, which almost always turns out to be a role 
of observer and witness . . . For the first variety (which to some extent represents the 
strong degree of the homodiegetic) we will reserve the unavoidable term autodiegetic’ 
(Figures III, 253; Narrative Discourse 245).
3It is this that Fielding, for example, saw as untenable in Richardson’s attempt to 
both represent the rhythms of lived experience and at the same time account for the 
production of the representation. Fielding’s Shamela writes, “Odsbobs! I hear him 
just coming in at the Door. You see I write in the present Tense . . . Well, he is in Bed 
between us . . . ” (18). Les Liaisons dangereuse, as a counterexample, seems to use the 
epistolary form without approaching this impasse of temporalities because its scheming 
characters are more concerned with their future than with the present. 
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surtout imagine immédiatement des conditions de beauté opposées, tue 
enfin presque tout mon plaisir. (qtd. in Tadié, 108)4
The kind of immersion that Proust describes before his other self 
intrudes has long been understood as an essential component of the 
aesthetic experience. Michael Fried, for example, in his analysis of 
eighteenth-century French painting, describes it as “the supreme fiction 
of the observer’s nonexistence” (108). If absorption in one’s life is to 
be represented in painting, Fried argues, there can be no connection 
between the realm of the beholder and that of the painted subject, 
because the very possibility of absorption is founded in the notion 
that there is no one watching; the subject is simply “there.” Indeed, we 
might say that fiction is born here, as a register that is heterogeneous 
to that of the “real” observer. On the contrary, in Proust’s letter, the 
“autre moi” who observes disrupts the reader’s immersion in the work 
in order to establish a connection between the actual reader and the 
work he reads. This effectively does away with the aesthetic illusion 
that there is no observer. For the young Proust, steeped in a paradigm 
of fiction that he is about to overturn, this kills his pleasure.
This emphasis on the observer at the expense of readerly pleasure 
will become in many ways the foundation of the Proustian aesthetic: 
the narrator of À la recherche du temps perdu is a “reader” of his own 
life experience, one who must ultimately alienate himself from this 
experience in order to disrupt the immersion in it, so that it can be 
narrated. For Proust, this is by no means an aesthetic of anti-enjoyment, 
but on the contrary, a bid to register this enjoyment on the side of the 
observer, rather than maintaining it on the level of the disembodied 
experience of reading. Part of this process involves, then, an alienat-
ing of oneself from one’s own enjoyment as an absorbed reader, in 
order to inscribe it back onto the plane of the observer. 
In the first paragraph of the novel, the narrator describes having 
fallen asleep while reading, and then waking to find that his reflec-
tions upon his book “avaient pris un tour un peu particulier; il me 
semblait que j’étais moi-même ce dont parlait l’ouvrage” (1:3).5 This 
4“When I read a poem by Leconte de Lisle, for instance, all the time that I am enjoying 
the infinite sensual delights as I did in the past, the other I is watching me, enjoying 
observing the causes of my pleasure, seeing a certain connection in them between 
myself and the work, and thus destroying the certainty of the work’s own beauty, above 
all it immediately starts imagining different prerequisites for beauty, and finally kills 
virtually all of my enjoyment” (Tadié, Marcel Proust: A Life, 80).
5“It seemed to me that I myself was the immediate subject of my book” (1:1).
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has the effect of putting the reader and the work on the same plane. 
But in doing so, the work itself as an objective entity becomes lost. 
We might think of this as a kind of mode d’emploi for reading the novel 
as a whole. The absorption must be disrupted, and the particular 
enjoyment of entering into a world that one did not create must be 
“killed” precisely because there is no one to see it, no one, without 
an observer, to register—and thus narrate—this enjoyment. There is 
a shifting of allegiances, then, between on the one hand, the reader/
narrator who fills the narrative foreground at the expense of the 
character absorbed in his world, and on the other, the character, so 
absorbed in experience as to preclude its registration on the plane 
of consciousness. It is the tension between these two poles, we might 
say, that propels the narrative forward.
In the novel, one of the main vehicles for portraying absorption is 
through the institution of habit. Habit, in the logic of À la recherche du 
temps perdu, is an immersion in the world that precludes the ability to 
see the world. For the one who is immersed in habit there is no one 
to see, no one to narrate. To articulate the habitual world requires 
that one exile oneself from it: when one can, habit becomes “un pro-
saïsme qui sert de grand réservoir de poésie à celui qui les traverse 
sans y avoir vécu” (1:49).6 Yet this paradox is confounded by the fact 
that the very act of alienating oneself from the habitual realm likewise 
produces a perspective which must then be accounted for, and which 
falls prey to habitual immersion again: one can exile oneself from a 
particular set of circumstances in one’s life, but one cannot extricate 
oneself from the habit of being a self. The immersion reasserts itself, 
then, in the consciousness of the one who would narrate this habitual 
being, which would then require an additional level of alienation to 
see it, creating what would amount to an infinite regress if there were 
nothing to stop this procreation of perspectives. Proust’s novel is rigor-
ous in its requirement that the position which the narrator assumes 
in order to achieve a perspective upon the habitual world is likewise 
subject to the same blindness that being immersed in it effects: this 
perspective must likewise be accounted for in the novel’s world. The 
narrator of À la recherche, then, is condemned to describe the world 
only from within the world: there is no perspective that the narrator as 
narrator can transcend in order to see. The question which serves as 
6“A prosaicness which serves as a deep reservoir of poetry to the stranger who passes 
through their midst without having lived among them” (1:67).
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the source for the novel then, is that of how to portray both observer 
and absorbed on the same narrative plane.
For the Proustian narrator, habit inserts itself between perception 
and experience. Confronted with the unknown or unthought, the 
force of habit lies in its ability to, in a certain sense, “fix” time. It does 
so by incorporating the unfamiliar back into the fold of familiarity 
through the appeal to an already established conceptual lexicon, one 
founded in past experience. It is in this way that this habitual vision 
saves itself from the confrontation with the present moment. That habit 
can be transgressed, however, is, we could say, the very “thesis” of the 
novel. The narrative gains its force through the privileged moments 
when the unfamiliar can be “caught” before it is subsumed again into 
the lethargy of habit, that is, before perception can be made to fit a 
conceptual mold. The narrator describes in À l’ombre de jeunes filles en 
fleurs, for example, hearing from within his room a dispute, almost a 
riot, outside. But as soon as he is able to conceptualize the sound, he 
eliminates “ces vociférations aiguës et discordantes que mon oreille 
avait réellement entendues — mais que mon intelligence savait que des 
roues ne produisaient pas»(2:399).7 The sounds that he initially hears 
without a corresponding visual concept, then, become lost signifiers 
that fade when they cannot be attached to anything. “Les noms qui 
désignent les choses,” the narrator concludes, “répondent toujours à 
une notion de l’intelligence, étrangère à nos impressions véritables 
et qui nous force à éliminer d’elles tout ce qui ne se rapporte pas à 
cette notion” (2:399).8 
In the novel, there is one way of recuperating these lost signifiers, 
of “fixing” them, in turn, so that they do not fade back into uncon-
sciousness, when habit, with its standardized view of the world, takes 
over: the aesthetic experience. Here, perception, cut off from its 
reference in the world, is freed to be experienced as such, and can 
bring about one of those “rares moments où l’on voit la nature telle 
qu’elle est,”(2:400)9 that is, when perception is not occulted by the 
conceptual intelligence, which is always one step behind the act of 
perception. It is in these terms that the narrator frames the long 
ekphrastic description of the painter Elstir’s view of the harbor of 
7“The shrill and discordant vociferations which my ear had really heard but which 
my reason knew that wheels did not produce” (2:566).
8“The names which designate things correspond invariably to an intellectual notion, 
alien to our true impressions, and compelling us to eliminate from them everything 
that is not in keeping with that notion” (2:566).
9“The rare moments when we see nature as she is” (2:566).
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Carquethuit. In a visual simile, the painting “avait préparé l’esprit 
du spectateur en n’employant pour la petite ville que des termes 
marins, et que des termes urbains pour la mer» (2:400).10 Here, in 
the transposition of the sea and the village, the two constituents are 
loosed from their referents in the world such that it is the perception 
of them, then, that is prioritized.
Gilles Deleuze writes, 
Proust parle souvent de la nécessité qui pèse sur lui : que, toujours, quelque 
chose lui rappelle ou lui fasse imaginer quelque chose. Mais, quelle que 
soit l’importance de ce processus d’analogie en art, l’art n’y trouve pas sa 
formule la plus profonde. Tant que nous découvrons le sens d’un signe 
dans autre chose, un peu de matière subsiste encore, rebelle à l’esprit. Au 
contraire l’Art nous donne la véritable unité: unité d’un signe immatériel 
et d’un sens tout spirituel. (53)11 
Yet it is only through recourse to this “peu de matière,” that spirit—
which Deleuze defines as the experience of a unity that can only be 
achieved outside space and time—can be evoked. 
Thus, the simile as the privileged rhetorical figure in À la recherche. 
In one sense, Proust’s elaborate transpositions of one part of the world 
onto another through comparison offer the possibility of a world where 
things are loosed from their anchors in the world, so that the phenom-
enon of experience, founded in perception, comes to the fore even 
as the schematic intelligence is demoted. In another sense, however, 
the simile does the opposite. Precisely because the components of a 
simile are taken from out of the “language” of this preconceptualized 
understanding of the world, the material world closes in on itself, as 
the simile, in its repertoire of the familiar, circumambulates the thing 
that it is attempting to describe but can never reach. One might then 
say that every simile attempts to achieve, as it casts itself out into the 
world, a view on the world that the narrator inhabits, but returns only 
with something else in the world. And thus, every simile brings back 
the failure that it cannot produce what it seeks to represent. 
These analogical chains, then, as Julia Kristeva writes, “a pour 
effet d’ouvrir la surface des signes vers la profondeur” (265)12 while 
10“Had prepared the mind of the spectator by employing, for the little town, only 
marine terms, and urban terms for the sea” (2:567).
11“Proust often speaks of the necessity that weighs upon him: that something always 
reminds him or makes him imagine something else. But whatever the importance of 
this process of analogy in art, art does not find its profoundest formula here. As long 
as we discover a sign’s meaning in something else, matter still subsists, refractory to 
spirit” (40). 
12“As a continuous chain of circles, analogy serves to guide the surface of time toward 
depth” (213).
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remaining, nonetheless on the surface. It is, in fact, only in this way 
that there can be a sense of depth in the cosmos of the novel, for if 
the narrative maintains, in its rigor, that the spoken must always be 
accounted for by postulating the presence of a speaker, there can be 
no privileging of narrative plane, no prioritized position by which one 
can get a “view” on the world of the narrative. Thus, depth must be 
inscribed on the surface.
It is difficult not to bring the madeleine into the discussion, then, 
as the point from out of which the story issues, and thus, in at least 
a technical sense, as its profoundest moment. Not only does the 
madeleine, as a workaday symbol, transmute extension in space and 
time into an evocation of a unity that binds the entropic dispersion 
of experience, but the madeleine also is a product of this disunity: 
it is a symbol for the binding of space and time, but it also exists in 
unbound space and time, and thus, as an element—a thing—in the 
narrative. As such, it must be accounted for as a constituent in what 
it evokes. It is thus, we might say, that the metaphor of the madeleine 
becomes translated into an outpouring of similes, of the world describ-
ing itself from within the world, precisely because the madeleine 
fails to maintain its metaphoricity. We see it in every simile, as the 
comparisons struggle against the ungiving confines of the world that 
the simile attempts to recuperate.
The extended visual representations in the narrative are particu-
larly informative in this regard. In one sense, Elstir’s painterly simile 
is less “defective” than that of the narrator’s verbal similes: if the act 
of reading a sentence must take place in time, and must be ordered 
according to the grammatical logic of language which is shaped by 
time, the painting can be perceived all at once; in doing so, it sup-
presses the boundary between the sea and the village, and is thus able 
to achieve a “multiforme et puissante unité” (2:400).13 Elstir’s painting 
presents then the possibility of, to quote Rimbaud, “un dérèglement 
de tous les sens” (249) because it is in detaching the familiar from its 
referent that the things of the world and the moments of a life can be 
made to describe, beyond their capacity, “la nature telle qu’elle est.”14 
In another sense, the painting is more defective, because it comes at 
an additional remove for the reader, who must then have this “puis-
sante unité” described in language, and thus, in sequential time. Yet, 
13“That multiform and powerful unity” (2:567).
14“A derangement of all the senses” (my translation).
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we might say, this is all the more effective in conveying the inability 
to depict this unity in existence (and the narrative as a whole, then, 
becomes a figure for existence as a whole). These peregrinations from 
thing to thing within the world re-transcribe this inability to see the 
world onto the plane of experience. What is important, then, is less 
that Elstir’s painting transposes sea and village, in privileging percep-
tion over reference, but rather, that perception itself is a constant 
wandering from thing to thing as it seeks to transcend its worldly 
frame in order to see itself.15
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s formulation of depth as a play between 
surfaces comes very close to that of Proust (and is often informed by 
his work): 
Ce qui fait énigme, c’est leur lien, c’est ce qui est entre elles — c’est que 
je voie les choses chacune à sa place précisément parce qu’elles s’éclipsent 
l’une l’autre —, c’est qu’elles soient rivales devant mon regard précisément 
parce qu’elles sont chacune en son lieu. C’est leur extériorité connue dans 
leur enveloppement et leur dépendance mutuelle dans leur autonomie. De 
la profondeur ainsi comprise, on ne peut plus dire qu’elle est “troisième 
dimension.” (64)16 
 Thus, “puisque les choses et mon corps sont faits de la même 
étoffe,” (21)17 one constituent (say, that of the simile) cannot embody 
the other, but rather, only overlap, each serving as the “vision” of the 
other. If Descartes saw no use in attempting to plumb the depths of 
the unknown, Merleau-Ponty appropriates Descartes’s notion of the 
unknown without negating it: rather, the unknown now becomes a 
constituent in the visible, the distance between me and the things 
that populate my perceptual field, as that which makes vision possible 
and necessary. Elstir’s “irrational” (from the Cartesian perspective) 
canvas, then, in which “le peintre avait su habituer les yeux à ne pas 
15Jonathan Crary argues that the invention of the stereoscope and its popularization 
after 1850 was crucial to the modern tendency to emphasize perception over reference. 
The stereoscope invented by Charles Wheatstone has the viewer place his eyes in front 
of two mirrors at 90 degree angles to one another. These mirrors then reflect, for each 
eye, two different slides, placed on either side of the mechanism. Crary concludes 
that the Wheatstone stereoscope “made clear . . . the disjunction between experience 
and its cause . . . [It] left the hallucinatory and fabricated nature of the experience 
undisguised. It did not support what Roland Barthes called ‘the referential illusion’” 
(Techniques of the Observer, 129).
16“The enigma consists in the fact that I see things each one in its place, precisely 
because they eclipse one another, and that they are rivals before my sight precisely 
because each one is in its own place. Their exteriority is known in their envelopment 
and their mutual dependence on their autonomy” (Basic Writings, 311).
17“Since things and my body are made of the same stuff” (Basic Writings, 296).
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reconnaître de frontière fixe, de démarcation absolue, entre la terre 
et l’océan” (2:400-01)18 becomes in itself a figure for the inability to 
experience this unity in life as it is lived, in its very dissonance with 
that of a lived experience that is accompanied by the conceptual 
intelligence.
It is this oscillation between time and the instant that is the issue in 
À la recherche. In Carquethuit, two signs, freed from their referent, are 
capable of circumambulating an instant, the instant of the madeleine, 
say, that they cannot represent—because they exist in space and in 
time—but evoke negatively. They become, then, catachrestical figures, 
representing that which cannot be said precisely because to say any-
thing must be said in time. But it follows, then, that perception itself 
becomes, likewise a catachrestical figure: our perceptions, insofar as 
we become conscious of them, are, like the Proustian similes that shift 
from worldly thing to worldly thing, ultimately, failures in themselves, 
much as we might understand the book that the narrator is writing as 
the catachrestic expression of the book that he can never write, and 
that we can never read, insofar as we and he exist in space and in time. 
Perception then, and its articulation drawn out in time, replaces the 
ungraspable unity of the world that one is already in, without substi-
tuting for it. Or, if it is a substitution, it is one that can never come 
to fully represent that for which it has been called in to substitute. 
Thus, rather than incarnating the unity of a world that can only be 
experienced partially, the perception accompanies this unity that it can 
never embody. Thus, the act of perception in À la recherche becomes 
a creative act, and as such, in its bringing into being—into space and 
into time—that which never was, the ineffable unity which it seeks, 
we might say, falls away. The narrator says as much in the madeleine 
scene as he considers the implication of the madeleine in the most 
complete declaration of the novel’s aesthetic before Le Temps retrouvé:
Grave incertitude, toutes les fois que l’esprit se sent dépassé par lui-même; 
quand lui, le chercheur, est tout ensemble le pays obscur où il doit cher-
cher et où tout son bagage ne lui sera de rien. Chercher? Pas seulement: 
créer. Il est en face de quelque chose qui n’est pas encore et que seul il 
peut réaliser, puis faire entrer dans sa lumière. (1:45)19
18“One of the metaphors that occurred most frequently in the seascapes which sur-
rounded him here was precisely that which, comparing land with sea, suppressed all 
demarcation between them” (2:567).
19“What an abyss of uncertainty whenever the mind feels that some part of it has 
strayed beyond its own borders; when it, the seeker, is at once the dark region through 
which it must go seeking, where all its equipment will avail it nothing. Seek? More than 
that: create. It is face to face with something which does not yet exist, to which it alone 
can give reality and substance, which it alone can bring into the light of day” (1:61).
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The narrative that pours out of the instant of the madeleine, as well 
as the pages that lead up to it (for let us not forget that the writer/
speaker of “Longtemps je me suis couché de bonne heure”20 [1:3], and 
thus, the one who is recalling his still-voluntary memory, has already 
eaten the madeleine) are then the act of a creation that co-exists 
alongside the inarticulable apprehension that the madeleine elicits. 
It is this that propels all the products of experience that the narrator 
describes into expressions of this apprehension: symbols, or catachre-
ses, that must then co-exist alongside the unity that they would hope 
to articulate. Where the apprehension comes all at once, the narrator 
can only move forward. Merleau-Ponty approaches this same paradox 
in discussing the necessity for accounting for one’s perspective in the 
act of epistemological reflection: the reflection “ne peut feindre de 
dérouler le même fil que l’esprit d’abord aurait roulé, d’être l’esprit 
qui revient à soi en moi, quand c’est moi par définition qui réfléchis; 
elle doit s’apparaître comme marche vers un sujet X, appel à un sujet 
X” (Le Visible et l’invisible, 54).21 The newly freed perceptions made 
available by the work of art then must re-create the absent unity that 
can be apprehended, but not narrated. It is for this reason that the 
visual, with its non-syntagmatic appeal, becomes the place where the 
wandering similes can find their home.
If the absorbed, receptive reader of Leconte de Lisle is in a position 
similar to that of the taster of the madeleine, it is only in the dimin-
ishing of the work’s force, even in the mastering of its force, that the 
reader can turn his receptiveness into the act of making articulate. 
The interposition of the neutral observer, then, who emerges out of 
the conventional, preconceived world of habit, must itself become 
the material which ultimately, the writer takes up in order to create 
a “picture” of his own subjection. The narrator must “kill” the mad-
eleine as symbol in order to take possession of it in time. We see this 
desacralizing gesture throughout the novel: in the captivity of Alber-
tine, for example, where, previously enthralled and aroused by her 
unknowability, the narrator confesses, “maintenant je n’étais heureux 
que dans les moments où de ces yeux . . . je parvenais à expulser tout 
mystère” (3:583).22 But also, upon his demanding of the maternal kiss 
20“For a long time I went to bed early” (1:1 translation modified).
21“The reflection cannot feign to unravel the same thread that the mind would first 
have woven, to be the mind returning to itself within me, when by definition it is I 
who reflect. The reflection must appear to itself as a progression toward a subject X, 
an appeal to a subject X” (The Visible and the Invisible, 32).
22“If at one time I had been overcome with excitement when I thought I detected 
mystery in Albertine’s eyes, now I was happy only at times when from those eyes . . . I 
succeeded in expelling every trace of mystery” (5:91).
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which becomes, in the narrator’s forcing his mother to abdicate her 
role, the sad date which inaugurated a new era.
It is in these aggressive acts, then, that an “autre moi” rises up 
and frames, in its cold neutrality, the self-absorbed in its world. Katja 
Haustein, using terminology that seemingly is drawn from Merleau-
Ponty’s lexicon, offers the intriguing notion of “emotional cavities”23 
as “zones where there is no . . . emotional contact or correspondence 
between the narrator and the world he perceives, but rather emotional 
distance and difference, zones where the narrator is left alone, standing 
before the frame” (161). As such, she situates the novel as “oscillat-
ing between a romantically inspired wholesome notion of affect and 
its modernist erosion” (171). Certainly, Proust seems to be departing 
from a paradigm of absorption in which the absence of the beholder 
is the “supreme fiction” that governs the aesthetic experience. And 
yet, rather than understanding it as the erosion of affect, we might, 
perhaps more productively, understand this as an exchange of affect, 
in an appeal to incorporate the observer into the picture. Yet the focus 
on the observer that this effects results in a corresponding numbness 
on the part of the object of perception, such as that which Merleau-
Ponty describes in the act of touching one hand with another:
Si ma main gauche touche ma main droite, et que je veuille soudain, par 
ma main droite, saisir le travail de ma main gauche en train de toucher, 
cette réflexion du corps sur lui-même avorte toujours au dernier moment: 
au moment où je sens ma gauche avec ma droite, je cesse dans la même 
mesure de toucher ma main droite de ma main gauche. (Le Visible et l’in-
visible, 24)24 
This exchange of affect, and of perception, then, if it is to be repre-
sented, must be flattened onto one canvas, must be created into an 
image that never “was,” and in this way, we might say, the narrator 
achieves a “picture” of his own subjection.
 This can occur because the narrator indeed engages in the kind 
of experiment that Merleau-Ponty describes. To do so, the narrator 
“reads” the perceiver who is absorbed in his world. It is this narrator-as-
reader (who becomes narrator-as-writer) who must now be accounted 
23“[C]e pli, cette cavité centrale du visible qui est ma vision, ces deux rangées en 
miroir du voyant et du visible, du touchant et du touché, forment un système bien lié 
. . . ” (Le Visible et l’invisible, 190).
24“If my left hand is touching my right hand, and if I should suddenly wish to ap-
prehend with my right hand the work of my left hand as it touches, this reflection of 
the body upon itself always miscarries at the last moment: the moment I feel my left 
hand with my right hand, I correspondingly cease touching my right hand with my left 
hand” (The Visible and the Invisible, 9).
866 Noam ScheiNdliN
for as well in the logic of the text. The narrator-reader “catches” the 
regressive trajectory of a self who must always locate himself elsewhere, 
and institutes this regress as a figure in the text, as a blank space that 
can never be overcome but that begins to shape distance into legibility. 
When the narrator eats the madeleine with his tea, he is only able 
to begin to consciously grasp the overwhelming sense of unity that 
pervades his consciousness once its force diminishes: the more pow-
erful the apprehension, the less articulable, and thus, narratable, is 
its “meaning.” The apprehension, which appears to come outside of 
language, can only be narrated in time, and thus, the narrative can-
not be true to this unifying experience itself. When the madeleine 
yields, what it yields must withhold itself, as it falls back into the 
things that populate the world in space and in time. The experience 
of the madeleine yielding, then, is that of a yielding only to another 
withholding. It is a withholding that mirrors the opaqueness of the 
original withholding of the madeleine before it yielded. As the nar-
rative ensues, the madeleine retrieves this original opacity, becoming 
just a thing in the world, and not its source. And, yet, it must do the 
job of representing both.
If this experience is to be narrated then, it must be done in language, 
and thus, in time. If the narrator wishes to trace back the path from 
which he came at the moment of the madeleine, he finds that he can-
not because he is only creating more narrative. In the act of “return-
ing” he is in fact, writing, creating. The unity of the experience of the 
madeleine, then, must be experienced as a series of overlays that resist 
the oblivion of the absorptive world of lived experience. To narrate 
this experience of being in time in time requires, then, antiabsorptive 
techniques.25 One such technique, as we have seen, occurs on the level 
of the visual. While the original experience of the madeleine itself 
occurs outside of the realm of perception, spatialization becomes a 
privileged figure in Proust precisely because, in contrast to narrative, 
it mirrors the all-at-once quality of the madeleine’s evocation, through 
the representation of time in spatial terms (let us remember that one 
of the working titles of the text, “The Cathedral,” speaks precisely to 
this spatialization of the linear experience of time).26
25On the “antiabsorptive,” see Bernstein, “The Artifice of Absorption.”
26Proust to Rosny Aîné, 22 December 1919: “[J]e veux que tout paraisse ensemble 
pour qu’on comprenne la composition à laquelle j’ai tout sacrifié et qu’on méconnait 
tellement qu’on croit que c’est un recueil de souvenirs fortuits!” The work as a structure 
held together by its own tension is of course an issue for Proust in his description of 
the novel as a cathedral. See Proust’s letter to Comte Jean de Gagneron of 1 August 
1919, as well as Sjef Houppermans, Marcel Proust constructiviste, 9ff.
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We can thus find traces of the madeleine’s call to unity in some of 
the elaborate visual descriptions in À la recherche. One such description 
is the ekphrastic paragraph that introduces Le temps retrouvé,27 which, 
I argue, can serve as an emblem of the work’s structure from within 
a narrative whose bid is to bind time in narrative. Yet what makes this 
passage emblematic is the peculiar quality of its ekphrasis, one which 
follows the logic of créer, rather than chercher, and in doing so seems 
to generate what it describes in the act of describing. In this move-
ment between description and creation, the narrator himself oscillates 
between writer/observer and narrated. In it we see the narrator in his 
“time living,” in his “time remembering” but it also points to the “time 
writing,” a moment that reaches into a presence that can, of course, 
never be caught by the writer. I propose, here, a close reading of it. 
The passage begins when the narrator has returned to Combray 
after many years, and stays in Tansonville with Gilberte, who is now 
the husband of Robert de Saint-Loup:
Toute la journée, dans cette demeure un peu trop campagne qui n’avait 
l’air que d’un lieu de sieste entre deux promenades ou pendant l’averse, 
une de ces demeures où chaque salon a l’air d’un cabinet de verdure et où, 
sur la tenture des chambres, les roses du jardin dans l’une, les oiseaux des 
arbres dans l’autre, vous ont rejoints et vous tiennent compagnie, isolés du 
monde—car c’étaient de vieilles tentures où chaque rose était assez séparée 
pour qu’on eût pu, si elle avait été vivante, la cueillir, chaque oiseau le mettre 
en cage et l’apprivoiser, sans rien de ces grandes décorations des chambres 
d’aujourd’hui où sur un fond d’argent, tous les pommiers de Normandie 
sont venus se profiler en style japonais pour halluciner les heures que 
vous passez au lit—, toute la journée, je la passais dans ma chambre qui 
donnait sur les belles verdures du parc et les lilas de l’entrée, les feuilles 
vertes des grands arbres au bord de l’eau, étincelants de soleil, et la forêt 
de Méséglise. Je ne regardais en somme tout cela avec plaisir que parce 
que je me disais: “C’est joli d’avoir tant de verdure dans la fenêtre de ma 
chambre,” jusqu’au moment où, dans le vaste tableau verdoyant, je recon-
nus, peint lui au contraire en bleu sombre, simplement parce qu’il était 
plus loin, le clocher de l’église de Combray. Non pas une figuration de ce 
clocher, ce clocher lui-même, qui, mettant ainsi sous mes yeux la distance 
des lieues et des années, était venu, au milieu de la lumineuse verdure et 
27In the most recent Pléiade edition of À la recherche du temps perdu, under the direction 
of Jean-Yves Tadié, Le Temps retrouvé begins with this passage. In the previous Clarac/
Ferré edition, Le Temps retrouvé begins several pages earlier, when the narrator begins 
his sojourn at Tansonville.
868 Noam ScheiNdliN
d’un tout autre ton, si sombre qu’il paraissait presque seulement dessiné, 
s’inscrire dans le carreau de ma fenêtre. (4:275)28
The first sentence of this passage begins with an adverbial phrase, 
“toute la journée,” followed by a prepositional phrase, in turn followed 
by the subordinate clause beginning with “qui.” By the time that we 
finish this clause, we might reasonably expect to be presented with 
the subject of the sentence. Rather, we are presented with yet another 
relative clause that not only continues to defer the subject, but also 
displaces the entire scene from that of the present house to that of a 
typical house, or perhaps, an imaginary one. 
The house where the narrator finds himself is a place to rest “entre 
deux promenades.” This would seem to reference the narrator’s recent 
revelation that the two archetypal “ways” that together define the two 
poles of the narrator’s cosmos, are, in fact, connected to each other, 
when Gilberte tells him, “Si vous voulez, nous pourrons tout de même 
sortir un après-midi et nous pourrons alors aller à Guermantes, en 
prenant par Méséglise, c’est la plus jolie façon” (4:268).29 This house, 
unseen by the reader, becomes, we might say, a locus, a source of unity 
from out of which the fragmented narrative issues; but as such, we 
might also understand this house as a figure for the narrator himself, 
who, likewise unseen by himself because he is the locus of perception, 
can only look out. Proust, likewise, in Contre Sainte-Beuve argues that 
28“All day long, in that slightly too countrified house which seemed no more than a 
place for a rest between walks or during a sudden downpour, one of those houses in 
which all of the sitting rooms look like arbours and, on the wall-paper in the bedrooms, 
here the roses from the garden, there the birds from the trees outside join you and keep 
you company, isolated from the world—for it was old wall-paper on which every rose 
was so distinct that, had it been alive, you could have picked it, every bird you could 
have put in a cage and tamed, quite different from those grandiose bedroom decora-
tions of today where, on a silver background, all the apple-trees of Normandy display 
their outlines in the Japanese style to hallucinate the hours you spend in bed—all day 
long I remained in my room which looked over the fine greenery of the park and the 
lilacs at the entrance, over the green leaves of the tall trees by the edge of the lake, 
sparkling in the sun, and the forest of Méséglise. Yet I looked at all this with pleasure 
only because I said to myself: ‘How nice to be able to see so much greenery from my 
bedroom window,’ until the moment when, in the vast verdant picture, I recognised, 
painted in a contrasting dark blue simply because it was further away, the steeple of 
Combray church. Not a representation of the steeple, but the steeple itself, which, put-
ting in visible form a distance of miles and of years, had come, intruding its discordant 
tone into the midst of the luminous verdure—a tone so colourless that it seemed little 
more than a preliminary sketch—and engraved itself upon the window pane” (6:10).
29“’If you like, we might after all go out one afternoon and then we can go to Guer-
mantes, taking the road by Méséglise, which is the nicest way’’’ (6:3).
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a writer can only write his “œuvre de soi” through recourse to the 
objects of his consciousness.30 
What the reader receives, then, is the description of a typical house, 
but not this house. This part of the sentence begins with an elocution 
that the reader of Proust knows well: “une de ces demeures où . . . ” 
This imaginary, or archetypal house, then, occupies the foreground of 
the sentence, as it spans more than one hundred words. The bulk of 
this part of the sentence is, in a yet further deferring of the subject, 
contained in apposition between two dashes, as it offers to the reader 
the description of the verisimilitudinous wallpaper, which seems to 
be the narrator’s real interest here. Only after the description of the 
wallpaper comes to a close at the second dash does the main thread 
of the sentence pick up again with “toute la journée,”—a reprisal of 
the beginning of the sentence of which the reader may have under-
standably lost track—before finally announcing the subject and the 
main verb of the sentence: “je la passais.” This brings us back from 
the imagined house to the real one, and though the latter part of the 
sentence still withholds a description of the interior, it concerns itself 
with describing the real—as opposed to the represented—vegetation 
that the narrator sees out of the window. 
Thus, the wallpaper that the narrator describes is unlocatable: the 
“non-place” where it “is” seems to participate in the novel’s prob-
lematization of the relation between the observer and the observed, 
much in the same way that, in the novel’s second sentence, when 
the narrator informs the reader that, “je n’avais pas le temps de me 
dire: ‘je m’endors.’” (1:3).31 Like the imagined house, the quoted 
sentence hangs from the void, said by no one, because there was no 
one there to say it.
Given this lack of a real house in which to situate the wallpaper, 
then, the lavishness and the description—“chaque rose était assez 
séparée pour qu’on eût pu . . . la cueillir . . . ”—takes on, especially in 
its juxtaposition to the paucity of words given to the real house—“un 
peu trop campagne”—an eerie quality. What the narrator describes 
so meticulously does not properly exist in the empirical world of the 
novel, so that the artifice of the wallpaper becomes conflated with the 
artifice of the description. Just as the wallpaper is remarkable because it 
simulates “real life” while remaining artificial, so too does the descrip-
30“En réalité, ce qu’on donne au public, c’est ce qu’on a écrit seul, pour soi-même, 
c’est bien l’œuvre de soi” (Contre Sainte-Beuve, 131). “In reality, what one gives to the 
public is what one wrote alone, for oneself: it is the book of the self” (my translation).
31“I did not have time to tell myself: ‘I’m falling asleep.’” (1:1).
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tion become remarkable because it, likewise, is a work of artifice that 
nonetheless possesses the quality of reality. The description borrows 
from that which it describes, creating a meticulous but imaginary set 
of circumstances, unsettling in its seeming to have commandeered 
the description the reader was about to receive of the “real” house 
from which the focus of the passage emanates.
The effect is still further heightened by the use of the imperfect 
form of the verb “être” in describing the wallpaper: “c’étaient de 
vieilles tentures.” Employed in this way, there is no clear delineation 
between the mode in which the real room is described, in a much 
more normalized imperfect form—“qui n’avaient l’air que . . . ”—and 
that of the imaginary or typical one. Real and imaginary, then, become 
“flattened” onto the same narrative plane. At the same time, within 
the description, the same process is occurring in the wallpaper: it is 
made to oscillate between two and three dimensions; the roses you 
can pick, the birds that you can put in a cage, offer themselves impos-
sibly into three-dimensional space, so that the suggestion of depth 
and the ineluctable lack of it creates a strange, shimmering effect, the 
depth of the real giving way to the flatness of artifice which it seems 
to continually reject without being wholly successful. 
This strange oscillation is further heightened by the operative sub-
ject of the clauses up until the second dash that marks the sentence’s 
reprisal with the repetition of “toute la journée”: all the decor that 
is described serves as a way “pour halluciner les heures que vous 
passez au lit”: the imaginary interior that is described, which is not 
the interior where the physical narrator is, has its counterpart in an 
equally unlocatable “vous” who, it seems, is neither the narrator nor 
the narrator, but a phantom “autre moi.”
It is in this confounding of modalities that we find an emblem of 
the book as a whole, which is built out of a “dérèglement” of narrative 
modalities, beginning in the first sentences, where the narrator wakes 
to find himself the immediate subject of the book he is reading. This 
conflated structure, then, offers an immersion that opens itself for 
the observer, who both stands outside and inside his narrative. This 
is possible only through the flattening of the depth of experience 
so that both observer and absorbed are represented on the surface. 
Likewise, in mapping this complex onto the structure of the novel 
as a whole, we see the “time living,” “time remembering,” and “time 
writing” superimposed upon each other. Let us remember that in the 
madeleine scene the narrator has not yet written anything (at least not 
anything substantial enough to be something like the novel that we 
871M L N
read). Rather, the madeleine makes available, beyond the “mémoire 
voluntaire” of the maternal kiss, and beyond the narrator’s youthful 
writing (in particular, the “Clochers de Martinville”) the source that 
will become the basis of the novel that we read.32 The madeleine 
makes available “time living” for “time remembering” which only 
becomes, after the matinée in Le Temps retrouvé, “time writing.” If the 
experience of the madeleine gives birth to the narrative of Combray 
and all that transpires after it, nonetheless, it must withdraw in order 
for the narration to take place in time; even so, the narration of the 
madeleine scene itself must conceal that it is a product of writing. It is 
only during the matinée sequence that we can finally understand the 
madeleine—as something written—to have been elicited from out of 
the matinée, in the same way that Combray was elicited from out of 
the madeleine. With this, the narrative has quietly shifted allegiances: 
whereas before, it was the madeleine that served as the impetus out of 
which the bulk of the story proceeded, now it is the revelation at the 
matinée that appropriates the madeleine and assumes responsibility 
as the foundation for the story. Thus, the madeleine and the matinée 
engage in an irresolvable oscillation where each makes the other its 
constituent; each generate its perspective by turning the other into 
material; each vies for the right to serve as the locus of the novel: the 
place of the observer. Yet neither can ultimately serve as such, because 
just at the point in which the one would gain narrative control, the 
other intrudes on its territory. Each component of the narrative refuses 
to subordinate itself to an overarching perspective, so that the overall 
effect is a flattening of the narrative plane, depth and surface made 
to coexist in a sheen that is perpetually unstable.
In the passage at hand, we see these poles both thematically and 
formally: thematically, in the wallpaper that oscillates between two 
and three dimensions; and formally, in the oscillation of the verb 
tenses that express narrative mood. In both cases, neither modal-
ity is assimilable to the other. Depth hovers on the surface, and the 
impossibility of conjoining the oscillating modalities here furtively 
brings impossibility as a constituent in the narrative: the narrative 
must cohere only around this absent unity of time and space, in time 
and space, and thus, only by representing its lack. The technique that 
Proust uses here is one that, as Genette observes, appears frequently 
32Which is not necessarily to say that what the narrator finally will write is indeed 
the novel that we read.
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in the novel: a description, seemingly of a general or recurring state of 
being, is then combined with the description of a uniquely occurring 
event, an effect which, Genette writes, “donne l’impression—plutôt 
déconcertante—de flotter” (175).33 The effect here, in concert with 
the sentence’s resistance to returning back to the level of the literal 
that it set for itself, is to create an interpenetration between nature 
and artifice, literal and figurative, and event and context. 
When we emerge from out of the description of the imaginary 
house and back into the real one, the “vous” of the first half of the 
sentence, now becomes “je” as the sentence finally arrives at its gram-
matical subject. The subject falls into himself, we might say, from out 
of the imaginary “vous” relocating the locus of enunciation. But as we 
move into this I-consciousness, we find that if there was a place in the 
sentence that was reserved for the description of the real room, it is 
the description of the imaginary room that occupies it: the descrip-
tion of the room that the reader may have thought was deferred, 
is in fact, displaced. The locatable “je,” which emanates from the 
corporeal narrator, can only see out: the sentence moves immediately 
to what the narrator can see from the window of his real—but to us 
invisible—room. Yet once again, we find that the real cannot remain 
simply real: what the narrator sees out the window is described as a 
“vaste tableau verdoyant” flattened against the window. Thus, in the 
sentence, real and artificial continually trade places: the real interior 
is only described through the vehicle of an imaginary interior, a 
description which obscures the real interior. Yet the imaginary interior 
takes the form of an artificial exterior, which then gives way to the 
description of the real exterior, which, in turn, becomes flattened into 
artificiality. The sense, in this oscillation between surface and depth, 
is of a picture that cannot contain itself.
In the midst of this oscillation between the real and the artificial, 
the narrator, looking out the window, says that he receives pleasure 
from this scene only because it is nice to be able to see so much 
greenery from his bedroom window. This “pleasure” of course, should 
be immediately suspect: it is the same dubious aestheticizing that 
the narrator often professes to have when he hesitates to admit that, 
because something has interposed itself between the observer and its 
33“[I]t gives the impression—a rather disconcerting one—of floating” (Narrative 
Discourse, 151).
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object, he is having none.34 However confounded the artificial and the 
real become in the play of the narrator’s description, they still, thus 
far have remained under the narrator’s control. Yet as the sentence 
progresses, the narrator himself becomes implicated in this play: he 
finds that he is no longer able to locate himself in one conscious-
ness. In order for him to experience anything like pleasure, he must 
narrate his pleasure, tell himself that someone like “un autre moi” is 
experiencing pleasure. The poor quality of the narrator’s absorption 
does not permit his perceptions to offer “voluptés infinies,” and so, 
pleasure can only come through the artificial generation of narrative 
(“C’est joli d’avoir tant de verdure dans la fenêtre de ma chambre”) 
and thus, through the positing of an imaginary other who can receive 
this narrative in time, and who can be compelled to believe what the 
narrator himself cannot. The “vous” who resolves himself into a “je” 
still needs a “vous,” because as “je” he is impoverished: absorbed in 
his world, he cannot see it until he tells it.
Let us call this imaginary other a “proto-reader.” Because the 
narrator continues to entertain the possibility of entering into this 
alienated self, he remains in despair. This we see in the numerous 
disappointments that recur throughout the novel: visiting Balbec; 
going to the theater; kissing Albertine, among others. Only when the 
proto-reader becomes a real reader, only when the narrator realizes 
that his alienation is ineluctable, and that the condition of meaning-
making is indeed one of perpetual alienation from life, can he then 
transmute this alienation into exultation:
[N]’était-ce pas pour m’occuper d’eux que je vivrais loin de ceux qui se 
plaindraient de ne pas me voir, pour m’occuper d’eux plus à fond que je 
34cf Le Côté de Guermantes: “Je me dis alors: ‘Je n’ai pas trop à regretter ma journée; ces 
heures passées auprès de cette jeune femme ne sont pas perdues puisque par elle j’ai, 
chose gracieuse et qu’on ne peut assez payer, une rose, une cigarette parfumée, une 
coupe de champagne.’ Je me le disais parce qu’il me semblait que c’était douer d’un 
caractère esthétique, et par là justifier, sauver ces heures d’ennui. Peut-être aurais-je 
dû penser que le besoin même que j’éprouvais d’une raison qui me consolât de mon 
ennui, suffisait à prouver que je ne ressentais rien d’esthétique”(2:468). “I said to myself: 
‘I needn’t regret my day too much, after all. These hours spent in this young woman’s 
company are not wasted, since I have had from her—charming gifts which cannot be 
bought too dear—a rose, a scented cigarette and a glass of champagne.’ I told myself 
this because I felt that it would endow with an aesthetic character, and thereby justify 
and rescue these hours of boredom. I ought perhaps to have reflected that the very 
need which I felt of a reason that would console me for my boredom was sufficient to 
prove that I was experiencing no aesthetic sensation” (2:226). 
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n’aurais pu le faire avec eux, pour chercher à les révéler à eux-mêmes, à 
les réaliser? (4 :564)35
Until he achieves this realization, the narrator who is narrated 
remains deluded by the possibility that there is an original unity of 
self to which he can return. Let us note that he has not yet eaten the 
madeleine, and thus, has not yet suffered the apprehension that unity, 
if it is to be recounted, must become fragmented. The experience 
of the madeleine, then, as much as it is one of unity, also becomes 
a first apprehension of the fragmented structure of life that will, in 
turn, serve as the basis for the narrator’s retrieval of unity in a modal-
ity outside time.
In the frame to which the narrator restricts himself, he remains 
unaware that there is no pleasure in his “plaisir” until the steeple 
of Combray intrudes itself upon the picture that he observes. This 
intrusion does not destroy the picture itself, but renders it unpleas-
ant. It becomes flattened into the picture, “peint lui . . . en bleu 
sombre, simplement parce qu’il était plus loin” so that it is its color 
that becomes highlighted in the foreground, rather than assimilated 
into an effect of depth or perspective. Yet with almost no pause, this 
painted steeple becomes “non pas une figuration de ce clocher, ce 
clocher lui même.” Here, depth is indeed painted on the surface as 
the steeple puts before the narrator’s eyes “la distance des lieues et 
des années.” The steeple, then, pierces the canvas in introducing the 
quality of depth, while at the same time, rendering this depth back onto 
the surface. As long as there is no steeple, the narrator can stare out 
at the greenery and piece together a narrative of its beauty, a beauty 
that he, as its reader, cannot experience first-hand. The verdure is 
all visibility and no depth. The steeple, however, in rendering “des 
lieues et des années” into visible form, are those of the narrator. The 
picture, then, is no longer something one can simply look at without 
seeing oneself already inscribed in it “s’inscrire dans le carreau de ma 
fenêtre.” Thus, all the lack of pleasure that characterizes the narra-
tor’s alienation now becomes a figure in this picture. Here, we might 
see the impossible coincidence of both observer and observed, such 
that, as Merleau-Ponty describes it, the body comes to be understood 
as “un être à deux feuillets, d’un côté chose parmi les choses et, par 
35“Was it not, surely, in order to concern myself with them that I was going to live 
apart from these people who would complain that they did not see me, to concern 
myself with them in a more fundamental fashion than would have been possible in their 
presence, to seek to reveal them to themselves, to realise their potentialities?” (6:437).
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ailleurs, celui qui les voit et les touche” (Le Visible et l’invisible, 178).36 
The verdure no longer appears as an object to a subject because the 
narrator sees himself incarnated in its existence. The steeple destroys 
the picture not by piercing through its flat screen, but by remain-
ing real in the picture: it cuts through the fiction that separates 
fiction from “reality,” offering not harmony but discordance on the 
flat plane. The promise that the imaginary wallpaper offers with its 
nearly real flowers and birds, then, is here fulfilled in the “picture” 
of the steeple, though this fulfillment is not what it was thought to 
be. As “chercher” becomes “créer,” reality envelops us into a fiction 
that we cannot step out of. The scene that the narrator sees rises up 
before him as a picture with its depth painted on the surface. The tone 
“si sombre” is the unseeable look of the seer inscribed on the plane. 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s profoundly Proustian notion that distance is 
not the opposite of proximity, but rather, that which makes anything 
like proximity, and thus, self-knowledge, possible:
C’est que l’épaisseur de chair entre le voyant et la chose est constitutive 
de sa visibilité à elle comme de sa corporéité à lui; ce n’est pas un obstacle 
entre lui et elle, c’est leur moyen de communication. C’est pour la même 
raison que je suis au cœur du visible et que j’en suis loin : cette raison est 
qu’il est épais, et, par là, naturellement destiné à être vu par un corps. (Le 
Visible et l’invisible 176)37
If the verdure that the narrator sees in the window is the sign of 
aesthetic pleasure, the steeple appropriates the sign, and transforms 
it into a sign, not of an aesthetic experience, but of reality. But the 
conditions for this transformation are possible because the view from 
the window, as a sign of pleasure, comes without pleasure: it is an 
empty sign. But this emptiness serves the function of delineating the 
sphere of the observer, without whom no pleasure can be experienced. 
Complete absorption might be pleasurable, but it leaves no room for 
the consciousness that someone is experiencing it. It is this, we might 
say, that brings the narrator to speech in this passage, but that, in a 
broader sense, makes the narrator possible. The emptiness of the sign 
of the steeple is precisely the distance between the narrator and the 
object of his perception.
36“Our body is a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among things and otherwise 
what sees them and touches them” (The Visible and the Invisible, 137).
37“It is that the thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for 
the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between 
them, it is their means of communication. It is for the same reason that I am at the 
heart of the visible and that I am far from it: because it has thickness and is thereby 
naturally destined to be seen by a body” (The Visible and the Invisible, 135).
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This realization is by no means limited to this moment, but rather, 
is implicated in the very structure of the text. In the well-known tele-
phone scene in Le Côté de Guermantes, for example, the first thing the 
narrator hears when his grandmother answers the telephone is not 
her voice, but rather, the voice of sound itself:
Et aussitôt que notre appel a retenti, dans la nuit pleine d’apparitions sur 
laquelle nos oreilles s’ouvrent seules, un bruit léger—un bruit abstrait—
celui de la distance supprimée—et la voix de l’être cher s’adresse à nous 
[. . .]. (2:432)38 
The “abstract sound” and the sound of the grandmother’s voice are 
physically co-extensive. Yet in the act of the recognition of the voice, 
the first thing that the narrator hears is that which occurs before 
sound: it is the distance that sound attempts to fill. The narrator 
hears, in that first utterance of his grandmother, the sound of the 
necessity of sound, the machinery of his own hearing. The narrator’s 
perception of the steeple operates similarly. It is not the steeple itself 
that he sees, but rather, distance incarnated, which takes the “style” 
of the steeple. The hearing of the “sound of distance,” then, on the 
telephone, and the seeing of the “picture of distance” as the steeple 
are those instances when the narrator confronts the underside of the 
perceptible. In doing so, he realizes that there can be no other narrator 
that can see what he cannot; the “abstract” sound then, is the sound 
of this not-seeing (in the case of the telephone scene, not-hearing), 
an original privation which, as far as the novel is concerned, is native 
to consciousness itself.
 As the novel progresses toward its ultimate epiphany, the tension 
between the observer and his absorbed counterpart becomes more 
and more emphatic. When the narrator, in Le Temps retrouvé, returns 
to Paris by train after his second stay in a sanatorium, he feels increas-
ingly constrained by his inability to take pleasure in experience, and 
his narration, his telling of the world to himself becomes more and 
more explicit: “‘Arbres, pensais-je, vous n’avez plus rien à me dire, 
mon cœur refroidi ne vous entend plus’ . . . c’est avec froideur, 
avec ennui que mes yeux constatent la ligne qui sépare votre front 
lumineux de votre tronc d’ombre” (4:433)39. He notices “les lentilles 
38“And as soon as our call has rung out, in the darkness filled with apparitions to 
which are ears alone are unsealed, a tinny sound, an abstract sound—the sound of 
distance overcome—and the voice of the dear one speaks to us” (3: 174).
39“‘Trees’ I thought, ‘you no longer have anything to say to me. My heart has grown cold 
and no longer hears you. . . . It is with indifference, with boredom that my eyes register 
the line which separates your radiant foreheads from your shadowy trunks” (6:238).
877M L N
d’or et d’orange dont il criblait les fenêtres d’une maison” (4:434)40 
but he is left bereft of any emotion. Not only does he despair of his 
ability to feel the world as he did when he was younger, he sees in 
this the indication that he has no talent for literature: “Si j’ai jamais 
pu me croire poète, je sais maintenant que je ne le suis pas” (4:433)41. 
The narrator has achieved such a level of alienation from his “native” 
absorption in the world that he has become all observer, at the expense 
of the “one” for whom all this observation is for. He has arrived, we 
might say, at the opposite pole from that of utter absorption in the 
world of habit. Yet as if in compensation for the narrator’s inability to 
register this experience emotionally, the imaginary interlocutor—the 
proto-reader—takes on an increasingly important role: it becomes the 
locus of feeling that is unavailable to “the narrator” himself: 
[P]ar acquit de conscience, je me signalais à moi-même comme à quelqu’un 
qui m’eût accompagné et qui eût capable d’en tirer plus de plaisir que moi, 
les reflets de feu dans les vitres et la transparence rose de la maison. (4:434)42 
The imaginary interlocutor however, is no less bereft than the «narra-
tor” is: “Mais le compagnon à qui j’avais fait constater ces effets curieux 
était d’une nature moins enthousiaste sans doute que beaucoup de 
gens bien disposés qu’une telle vue ravit, car il avait pris connaissance 
de ces couleurs sans aucune espèce d’allégresse” (4:434).43 
But out of this lacuna between perception and the pleasure that it 
produces, comes the possibility of writing. If the narrator has not yet 
begun to write, and complains of his inability to do so, he neverthe-
less “forgets” this and begins to characterize this very inability, in a 
farce that the narrator shares with the reader at the expense of the 
hero, as writing:
Si j’avais vraiment une âme d’artiste, quel plaisir n’éprouverais-je pas devant 
ce rideau d’arbres éclairé par le soleil couchant, devant ces petites fleurs 
du talus qui se haussent presque jusqu’au marchepied du wagon, dont je 
pourrais compter les pétales, et dont je me garderais bien de décrire la 
40“The glitter of gold and orange which the sun splashed upon the windows of a 
house” (6:239).
41“If ever I thought myself as a poet, I know now that I am not one” (6:238).
42“[T]o satisfy my conscience, I indicated to myself now as to someone who was 
travelling with me and might be able to extract from them more pleasure than I, the 
flame-like reflexions in the windows and the pink transparency of the house” (6:239).
43“But the companion whose attention I had drawn to these curious effects was evi-
dently of a less enthusiastic nature than many more sympathetically disposed persons 
who are enraptured by such sights, for he had taken cognisance of these colors without 
any kind of joy” (6:239).
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couleur comme feraient tant de bons lettrés, car peut-on espérer transmettre 
au lecteur un plaisir qu’on n’a pas ressenti? (4:434)44 
The reader becomes a figure in the narrative just at the moment 
when the narrator finds it impossible to “read.” If the perceiver must 
find it impossible both to perceive and be the observer of his percep-
tions, with the reader as a constituent of the text, he becomes a “corps 
à deux feuillets,” catching the impossibility of observing this absorp-
tion, by foregrounding the distance between observer and observed. 
The moment of unity of observer and perception, then, must exist 
alongside the created narration, attenuating perception by expanding 
the frame of the universe to include narration. It is here, then, that 
the writer, likewise, becomes a figure in the text. The novel becomes 
a picture of its writer’s subjection to a world that he cannot master.
It is this clarified understanding of this triumvirate of modalities, 
then, that occupies the rest of the novel: “time experiencing,” “time 
remembering” and “time writing” exist alongside each other in a 
manner that can be portrayed, but that can never be experienced in 
life. Again, debarking from a cab, in a mood of “languissant ennui,” 
the narrator tells himself that he feels “en essayant cette description 
rien de cet enthousiasme qui n’est pas le seul mais qui est un premier 
critérium du talent” (4:444).45 He is on his way to the Guermantes’ 
matinée, where he will discover that he is, indeed, a writer and this is 
what there is to write about.
If the madeleine offers the narrator an apprehension of unity, a 
unity that can only exist qua unity outside of time, we along with the 
narrator now understand that the perception, and thus, narration, 
of this unity must exist in time, alongside this original experience; 
not as its replacement, but as its companion. Proust writes, in La 
Prisonnière, “Le poète est à plaindre, et qui n’est guidé par aucun 
Virgile d’avoir à traverser les cercles d’un enfer de soufre et de poix, 
de se jeter dans le feu qui tombe du ciel pour en ramener quelques 
habitants de Sodome!” (3:711).46 The narrator has no guide because 
44“If I really had the soul of an artist, surely I would be feeling pleasure at the sight 
of this curtain of trees lit by the setting sun, these little flowers on the bank which 
lifted themselves almost to the level of the steps of my compartment, flowers whose 
petals I was able to count but whose colour I would not, like many a worthy man of 
letters, attempt to describe, for can one hope to transmit to the reader a pleasure that 
one has not felt?” (6:239).
45“. . . In attempting this description, not a spark of that enthusiasm which, if it is 
not the sole, is a primary criterion of talent” (6:253).
46“The poet is to be pitied who must, with no Virgil to guide him, pass through the 
circles of an inferno of sulphur and brimstone, who must cast himself into the fire 
that falls from heaven in order to rescue a few of the inhabitants of Sodom!” (5:271).
879M L N
he is not tracing the path of a world that was already there, but is 
rather, through the intervention of his “autre moi,” creating a world 
for the first time. The absorption that the narrator seeks is not one 
that excludes its beholder, but that is enmeshed in the world in the 
act of beholding. 
The long sentence that takes up the bulk of the description of the 
house at Tansonville, forms itself through a long series of subordinate 
clauses, moving further into the illusory scene, and then, struggling to 
emerge from out of the illusion and back into a physically locatable 
consciousness. The narrator only achieves this by finally interrupting 
the play of illusion, and, without ending the sentence, recommencing 
the sentence again, and asserting himself—je— as its subject, putting 
the consciousness which emanates from out of his body, alongside that 
of the fictive—vous— observer. Denis Diderot writes in Pensée detachées, 
“Rien n’est beau sans unité; et il n’y point d’unité sans subordination,” 
(qtd. Fried, 84). Though Diderot is discussing painterly composition, 
rather than sentence structure, nonetheless, the notion of subordina-
tion in both realms entails that of maintaining only one operative sub-
ject, an overarching unity that precludes its telling, its being observed. 
Here we see the paradigm move from one of subordination to that 
of accompaniment: a living alongside a unity that both upholds this 
unity in all its inexpressibility, and that fragments it into articulation: 
an endless and unresolvable oscillation between an observer and the 
unobserved whole, each inscribed on the surface.
LaGuardia Community College, City University of New York
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